VERY GREAT religion, Friedrich von Hügel once observed, is comprised of three fundamental elements: the mystical, the institutional, and the intellectual.
more the locus where the challenges posed by the study of the religious element and the institutional element will come home for reflection on where we have been and where we may wish to go.
In the meantime, of course, those thinkers and scholars principally involved in understanding the intellectual element of Catholicism have further tasks of their own. For insofar as philosophy and theology are reflective and correlational disciplines, they attempt, in prpperly general terms, to correlate critically an interpretation of the tradition and an interpretation of the contemporary situation. 5 Philosophy and theology inevitably pay attention to the shifts not only in the tradition but in the contemporary situation itself. 6 Here the recent explosion of interest across the disciplines in the categories "rationality" and "modernity" are two principal candidates for new philosophical and theological study. 7 To argue that our age is better characterized as postmodern than as modern is admittedly to solve very little. But it is to acknowledge that radical plurality and a heightened sense of ambiguity, so typical of all postmodern movements of thought with their refusal of premature closure and their focus upon the categories of the "different" and the "other," are here to stay. 8 A major element in that acknowledgment is the abandonment of any claim of traditional and modern forms of philosophy and theology that cannot account for their own linguistic and thereby historical character. In the modern period, positivism has been the principal but not sole intellectual bearer of strictly ahistorical claims. But however powerful positivism still is as a cultural force, it is intellectually a spent force. 9 Neither the natural sciences nor the social sciences nor the humanities any longer linger over the false promises of this last The Western temptation to believe in its own intellectual superiority and thereby certainty is dying as slowly, and admittedly as dangerously, as the Western colonial period itself. 10 Hence the interest across the disciplines in the exact nature of Western "rationality." Hence the insistence in theology to cease our Eurocentric ways and learn to interpret the polycentric 11 theologies of a global church. Western thinkers, including theologians and philosophers, now feel obliged not merely to study but to learn from non-Western traditions of reason. Western thinkers are also deeply involved in recovering the more modestly conceived premodern resources of Western reason in such classics of reason as the nature of rational dialogue in Plato, the nature of rational argument in Aristotle, and the development of scholastic method among the medievals. 12 At the same time as these retrievals of the classic Western resources on reason are occurring, new and strong hermeneutics of suspicion on modern Enlightenment notions of rationality continue: those proposed by the "others" in the other great civilizations; those proposed by the marginalized and oppressed "others" in the Western tradition itself; those occasioned by the acknowledgment of the omnipresent relationships of power in all claims to knowledge; and those occasioned by the hermeneutical and pragmatic turn in Western thought-all focused, in sum, on the postmodern concern with "otherness" and "difference." 13 As a single example of these developments, this congeries of issues on our notions of rationality can be seen clearly in contemporary Western feminist theory, which at its best is the most ethically challenging and intellectually sophisticated exposure of the full dilemmas of our pluralistic and ambiguous postmodern moment. Catholic history in modernity. 15 The neo-scholastic thinkers of the late 19th and early 20th century, for example, used all their considerable intellectual gifts to try to refute modernity in its Cartesian form. Ironically, in this very attempt at refutation they imposed Cartesian forms and an ahistorical quest for certainty on the quest for understanding of classical Catholic theology, like that of their own presumed hero, Thomas Aquinas. But this irony only provoked a greater intellectual tragedy for Catholic theology in the early 20th century. Just when an alliance, however uneasy, was being forged between Catholic thought and modernity, the institutional Church intervened. The silencing of the Catholic Modernists was not merely intellectually self-defeating and ethically and religiously unsettling; it was also unnecessary, as the parallel history of liberal Protestant thought in the same modern period shows. Critical inquiry, left to the self-correcting power of the entire community of inquiry, can and should be trusted to provide whatever corrections it may eventually need. As Wilhelm Pauck observed, Protestant neo-orthodox thought, despite its strong criticism of Protestant liberal theology, was not a return to a premodern, orthodox model for theology. Protestant neo-orthodoxy was, rather, a self-corrective moment within the same postorthodox theological paradigm first developed by t^he great liberal theologians from Schleiermacher forward.
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Pauck seems to me exactly right about the history of Protestant theology in the modern period. His insight renders all the more poignant the fate of Catholic Modernism. For what that event meant, for Catholic thought, was that many of the best theologians and philosophers of that period retired to purely historical work. This historical vocation was and is a noble calling, surely, and one which in the long run proved eminently enriching to understanding the fuller tradition of Catholic thought and practice. Indeed, the great generation after the Modernist debacle-the generation, after all, which produced the self-reforming movements that issued in the Second Vatican Council-spent most of their early years as scholars retrieving the classic resources of the Catholic tradition in institutionally bleak times; the great ressourcement or "return to the sources" of French The dialectical character of political and liberation theologies assures that the "correlation" will not prove a merely harmonious, "liberal" one. 
CATHOLIC METHODS OF CORRELATION IN FUNDAMENTAL THEOLOGY
In theology at the moment there is occurring, across the traditions, a great divide. Many theologians insist that the modern paradigm of some form of a revised correlational model for theology has reached the end of its usefulness. One basic reason for that claim is, paradoxically enough, a typically correlational move: the claim that in our situation we should now acknowledge-as modernity itself lingers over its own self-distrustthat modern theology by the very attempt to correlate an interpretation of the tradition (usually by some candidate for the heart of the tradition) with an interpretation of the ever-changing modern situation (usually by some candidate for the principal religious questions posed by modernity or postmodernity) has lost its distinctively theological center by attempting to be correlational at all. 31 This methodological loss has also occasioned a substantive loss; for every tradition is in danger of losing its distinctiveness through the subtle erosions of all particularities by the illusory claims to universality of Western Enlightenment modernity. On this scenario it is time to call theology back to its own task-something like a "thick description" of the tradition for the tradition's own sake. ^he contrast of all Western Christian (Augustinian) theology with Eastern Orthodox theology remains largely a matter of how to interpret Augustine.
^In Plurality and Ambiguity (n. 8 above).
âl See Lindbeck's penetrating observations on the dangers, in a consumerist culture, of an emphasis on "experience" in The Nature of Doctrine (n. 28 above).
Hence anticorrelational theologians appeal to Geertz-like understandings of theology as, in effect, a kind of descriptive religious anthropology, or they appeal to intratextual enterprises like literary criticism's ability to provide close readings of the details (character, plot, point of view, metaphor, narrative) of the Christian founding biblical narratives.
32
Hence the anticorrelational theologians employ the later Wittgenstein and the word "foundationalism" sometimes to cover ground all the way from any Cartesian or neo-scholastic quest for certainty to any claim for the self-transcending character of reason at all. 33 Hence the return, in Protestant theologies, to Barth's theological method and his reading of Protestant theological history. Hence the equally strong interest, in several Catholic theologies, in the theological method of Balthasar as an alternative to Rahner, Lonergan, and their successors.
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It is a puzzling scene. On the one hand, correlational theologians are informed that their concern with analyses of modernity and postmodernity (under the rubric of the "situation") has caused the problem. On the other hand, they are given a typically situational analysis: that the loss of identity by all traditions in modernity is the central situational question facing all theologians who can see our present situation clearly.
On the Hügel model proposed above, there is no good reason to reject the genuine gains which such new anticorrelational theologies promise. Those gains include disciplinary ones like the greater use in theology of anthropology and literary criticism. They include substantive gains like the insistence on the need to pay closer intratextual attention to the biblical narratives for Christian self-identity and to defend the centrality of a concern with Catholic ecclesial identity and the centrality of "visible form" for Catholic theology. 35 Correlational models of theology, after all, also insist on the need for criteria of appropriateness to the tradition. 42 It is to be noted that this demand is formulated by the intratextual needs of the logic of the Christian understanding of God, and not only from modern situational needs. On the latter, the approach of limit questions to inquiry itself remains a fruitful one. On the former, I can see no way, on purely inner-Christian grounds, to deny the universality and necessity of the Christian understanding of God. A lesser "god," for the Jew, Christian, and Muslim, is not God. 43 More exactly, insofar as the situational analysis is an intrinsic part of the theological task, apologetics will remain intrinsic and thereby systemic rather than an ad hoc part of that same task. to hold the field as an ever revisionary and ever self-critical mode of inquiry. Like Husserl in his constant rethinking of phenomenology, fundamental theologians aware of these difficulties must always be beginners; for each step forward seems to expose new difficulties that force one back again to rethink the beginnings of that peculiar mode of inquiry that is fundamental theology. Like Husserl's own enterprise, correlational fundamental theology could end in a failure that has all the marks of classic tragedy: witness that great tragic text of and on modernity, Husserl's Crisis of the European Sciences. 44 Any transcendental mode of inquiry like Husserl's will function well if, and only if, it can account for its own linguistic and historical essence. This was the principal reason for the turn to hermeneutics among Husserl's successors (Scheler, Heidegger, Gadamer, Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur, and even, in his odd way, Derrida). This, too, is the reason for the retrieval of pragmatism and the new alliance of pragmatism with hermeneutics among so many contemporary Anglo-American philosophers (Putnam, Bernstein, Toulmin, Charles Taylor, and even, in his odd way, Rorty).
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CRITERIA FOR FUNDAMENTAL THEOLOGY IN THE NEW POSTMODERN SITUATION
If theology is to continue to have a systematically apologetic task, and if that task is to prove adequate to the contemporary postmodern situation, then new criteria for the task are needed. Traditional modern fundamental theologies relied too exclusively on transcendental inquiry-and, too often, models ofthat inquiry not explicitly related to the questions of language (and thereby plurality and historicity) and questions of history (and thereby ambiguity and postmodern suspicion, not merely modern critique). 46 One way to try to clarify the present state of fundamental theology (short of abandoning it with the anticorrelationists) is to clarify anew the tripartite set of criteria needed in order to allow fundamental theology to fulfil its correlational task. 47 general terms, the question of meaning and truth is a question of clarifying: first, the hermeneutical notion of truth as manifestation; second, how a given claim to manifestation coheres or does not cohere with what we otherwise consider reasonable; third, the ethical-political implications of these claims. 48 All three sets of criteria revise, even as they allow for, the kind of transcendental reflection proper to theological inquiry. All three criteria, moreover, clarify how these hermeneuticpragmatic-transcendental concerns of the apologetic (or correlational) element in fundamental theology have distinct affinities to the various proposals for a mystical-prophetic model for systematic and practical theologies.
49 Such, at least, is one way to read the present conflict of interpretations on theological method in contemporary Catholic theologies: fundamental, systematic, and practical. By concentrating on the need for new criteria for fundamental theology, one may hope to illuminate the fundamental element in systematic and practical theology as well. 50 This kind of reflection has impelled me in recent years to try to rethink the character of the criteria needed for correlational theology in the new situation. Those methodological criteria, I further believe, can not merely account for but, if properly open to learning anew, can also appropriate the genuine gains of the new anticorrelationalists in Catholic and Protestant theology alike.
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First, the hermeneutical criteria of truth as manifestation. 52 The central hermeneutical category is "possibility." Insofar as hermeneutics is grounded in the reality of conversation with the claim to attention of the other, and insofar as hermeneutics is fashioned to relate experience directly to language and history, hermeneutics proves one fruitful philosophical tradition for the present dilemma. Moreover, as post-Gadamerian hermeneutics has yielded its own history-of-effects, there is now available, pace Gadamer, a greater role both for explanatory methods (Ricoeur), ideology-critique (Habermas), and even plurality than an 48 The criteria are not intended to be cumulative but demand a coherence of all three in order to function properly. 49 entails only the notion that some relationship is involved. That relationship may (rarely) be one of identity-as in some of the proposals of liberal Protestant "culture Christianity" and some of the Catholic Modernists. That relationship may also be one of nonidentity (existentially, confrontation)-as in the challenge of correlational theology to much of secular modernity's interpretation of secularity as secularistic and thereby nonreligious or antireligious. 67 The relationship may also be one of similarity-in-difference-as in analogical theologies; or identity-indifference-as in dialectical theologies. 58 The point of correlation is the need to relate critically interpretations of both tradition and situation. The method of correlation, like all good method, provides only a heuristic guide to the inquiry. The inquiry is always hermeneutically determined by the question, the subject matter. No theologian can decide before the actual inquiry whether identity or nonidentity or identity-in-difference or similarity-in-difference should obtain. Method is always and only a heuristic guide: a useful, critical guide which, if allied to flexible criteria, can aid but never replace the actual theological inquiry.
But whatever the fate of the strategy of an analogical imagination for rendering possibilities into similarities-in-difference, the larger issue is elsewhere: in the category of possibility itself. All possibilities can be understood more accurately as suggestive possibilities. The adjective "suggestive" serves as a reminder that "possibility" need not be a "live, momentous, and forced" option in order to prove a genuine possibility.
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As reception theory in hermeneutics reminds us, a whole spectrum of responses to any classic is available. 60 That spectrum can range all the way from a shock of recognition (in aesthetic terms) or faith (in religious terms) to a sense of tentative response to a genuine, i. sibility is its rethinking of the primordial character of truth as manifestation. The hermeneutical tradition from Heidegger through Gadamer and Ricoeur defends the primordial notion of truth as event of manifestation. This notion of truth as manifestation has some singular advantages for this first general set of criteria for correlational theology. The primary advantage is that the notion of truth as manifestation (and recognition on the side of the subject) more closely fits both notions of revelation as event of God's self-manifestation and the response of faith as gifted recognition. 61 The truth of religion, like the truth of its nearest analogue, art, is primordially a truth of manifestation (more exactly, disclosure-concealment and human recognition). relational theology by being rendered as hermeneutical possibilities and thereby as new theological resources. 64 Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan knew instinctively this singular truth of the need for hermeneutical reflection. For, however great the turn to the mystical was in both the later Rahner and Lonergan (and it was), 65 they never abandoned the theological need to render these classic possibilities available to those nonmystics (including theologians) whose sense of religious possibility can be heightened by hermeneutical dialogue with the mystics.
The future of serious Catholic theology lies with its ability to recover these classic resources of the mystical tradition without forfeiting the need to retrieve them critically. Hermeneutical thought, with its grounding in the notion of truth as manifestation, provides one promising way to achieve this necessary substantive rethinking of Catholic theology. Moreover, as Gershom Scholem has observed in the case of kabbalism, the re-emergence of mystical readings in all prophetic traditions is also the re-emergence of the repressed archaic traditions. 66 Such seems to be the case with many forms of Catholic mysticism as well. As Eliade's work makes clear (with its grounding in a hermeneutics of manifestation), the so-called "pagan" roots of Christianity need constant retrieval. 67 Such retrieval is available for all those willing to take the mystics' readings of our prophetic heritage seriously again.
And yet, even these hermeneutical criteria need further testing. They provide us with an ability to understand truth as primordially an event of manifestation and thereby to understand anew the kind of truth claim in the event of revelation and the gifted response-recognition of faith. At the same time, they provoke further questions on how these manifestations cohere with what we otherwise know or, more likely, believe to be the case. The second set of criteria may be described, generically, as a rough coherence with what we otherwise know or, more likely, believe to be the case. 68 The danger is that this set of criteria (under rubrics, e.g., like strict verification and strict falsification) will so quickly take over that the notion of truth as event of manifestation will quickly become a distant memory. 76 The more careful proponents of communication theory in our day continue that PlatonicAristotelian line. 77 As did Lonergan and, before him, Aquinas.
What the theologians add to such inquiry on reason-and it is, to be sure, no minor addition-is the further relevant question, the strictly transcendental question, of the nature of ultimate reality. Above all, it is the self-correcting and unrestricted character of inquiry itself which demands a posing of this question for rational inquirers unwilling to stop the inquiry arbitrarily. 78 What theologians need to be willing to continue to argue is the reasonableness of this question and what reasonable, relatively adequate answers we might have as inquirers on that question-a question provoked by inquiry itself for any thoughtful inquirer. If theologians expect certainty in their answers to these limit questions of reason, they are doomed to failure. But if theologians are faithful to the logic of the subject matter they presume to study (the nature of ultimate reality) and the coherence of the self-manifestations of God and the logic of inquiry itself with what we otherwise reasonably hold, they cannot avoid asking this question of ultimate coherence. Apologetics must always be an intrinsic aspect of all Christian theology.
79 Alternatively, both systematic theology and practical theology need fundamental theology. Even the explicit and implicit cognitive claims of the mystics should be inquired into in order to see how they cohere or do not cohere with what we otherwise know or believe to be the case. 80 To abandon that critical correlational task of theology is to abandon, within theology, its reflective task and to abandon as well the claims of all the prophets and mystics to speak directly and purposively to the human search for meaning and truth. It is indeed important in thought, as Wittgenstein insisted and the anticorrelationalists love to repeat, to know when to stop. But the anticorrelationist theologians stop too soon, or more exactly, will not even begin the reflective questions on hermeneutical manifestation as possibility and the coherence of those possibilities to reason-questions which theologians like Aquinas and Lonergan show is also the nonfoundationalist question of inquiry itself, the question Christians and Jews name the question of God. A systematic or practical theology that refuses its own need for a fundamental theology is a truncated vision of the fuller task of theology. For theology at its best is not an exercise in the quest for certainty at all, but includes the difficult, necessary exercise in the quest for some understanding of how all claims to meaning and truth in the revelatory and salvific manifestations of faith cohere with the character of the self-correcting, unrestricted nature 78 See Lonergan, Method in Theology (New York: Seabury, 1972). 79 This is on intratextual (i.e., the logic of the claims of the reality of God) as well as situational grounds: see Tillich, Systematic Theology 1 (n. 6 above) 6-8. 80 See Louis Dupré's The Other Dimension (New York: Seabury, 1979). of inquiry itself. 81 As any participant in contemporary theology soon discovers, moreover, a further set of criteria will and should emerge from the inquiry itselfgenerically ethical-political criteria. 82 These criteria, so familiar to the prophetic core of Christianity and Judaism, will continue to enter the theological conversation in several routes. First, the religions themselves, especially but not solely in their prophetic strands, demand them. Secondly, our very nature as human beings demands ethical assessment.
There is no manifestation disclosure that is not also a call to transformation. There is no revelation without salvation. There is no theological theory without praxis. There need be no hermeneutic without pragmatics. There need be no divisions between the mystical and prophetic strands of the great tradition unless we arbitrarily impose them. The pragmatic turn of hermeneutics itself--as indeed of much contemporary discourse philosophy-fully shares in this insistence on the need for ethicalpolitical criteria. In that sense we are all the heirs of William James's insistence on the criteria of ethical, humane fruits, or consequences for action, for praxis, both individually and societally. Even here, however, our situation is more difficult and more parlous than the situation faced by early modernity or even the classical pragmatiste. On the individual side the rampant problems of possessive individualism have become a major ethical dilemma for modern Western societies. 83 More puzzling still, the very notion of the self, so cherished in almost all Western philosophies and theologies (even those, like process thought, highly critical of earlier substantialist notions of the self), has become a central problem in interreligious dialogue where several highly sophisticated Buddhist and Hindu notions of "no-self enter, along with several postmodern critiques of the self (e.g., Kristeva and Lacan), to radicalize all more familiar Western revisionary notions of self. 84 The ethical-political criteria must meet further challenges: above all from the discovery of the inevitability of concrete social-political realities embedded in all discourse and the theological reformulations of the prophetic strands of these traditions into several distinct political and liberation theologies. In the meantime the recovery of pragmatic criteria of personal ethical and political consequences for action remains a necessary set of general and flexible criteria for serious theology todayas the feminist, liberation, and political theologians, as well as the new pragmatiste, argue; as the new insistence on the centrality of praxis justly insists.
85
That all these criteria themselves need further reflection and refinement beyond the brief analysis given above is obvious. For even if these criteria are, on the whole, 86 sound, they still cannot replace the actual task of theological inquiry on particular questions but only inform it with the kind of questions and some general heuristic criteria for asking those questions.
On this reading the pragmatic turn of European hermeneutics, like the hermeneutic turn of Anglo-American analytical pragmatics, is merely the expression of the drive of contemporary inquiry to demand a fuller set of criteria for all inquiries. The systematic and practical theological analogues of this hermeneutic-pragmatic turn in fundamental theology is the new search in many Christian theologies for both mystical and prophetic readings of the rich and pluralistic tradition. 87 The future, I believe, belongs to those mystico-prophetic systematic and practical theologies. But the future will belong best even to these great emerging and global options if the traditional theological concerns of apologetics, reformulated in the modern period as correlational theologies, continue to be reformulated when the need is clear. As Hügel knew as well as Husserl, in such reflectively methodological questions we must always be beginners. And that willingness to begin always anew is at least as important an injunction as the knowledge of when to stop.
